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The paper examines a large population analog of ﬁctitious play in which players
learn from personal experience, focusing on what happens when a single rational
player is added to the population. Because the learning process naturally generates
contagion dynamics, the rational player at times has an incentive to act nonmyopi-
cally. In 2 = 2 games the dynamics are asymmetric and favor risk dominant
equilibria. A variety of other examples are presented. Journal of Economic Litera-
ture Classiﬁcation Number: C7. Q 1997 Academic Press
1. INTRODUCTION
One of the most fundamental questions in game theory is the justiﬁca-
tion of Nash equilibrium or other solution concepts. Recently, there has
been a surge of interest in boundedly rational learning processes by which
players might come to play an equilibrium, and in particular in models
related to the classic model of ﬁctitious play.
1 The standard ﬁctitious play
model is quite stylized; in particular, it involves two players who act
myopically while facing each other repeatedly. If the model is interpreted
literally, it is difﬁcult both to justify why players should do this and to
argue that we as economists should devote so much attention to a model
which could at most tell us that when two players play each other
*This paper is a revised version of an earlier working paper entitled ‘‘A Little Rationality
and Learning from Personal Experience.’’ I thank Dan Friedman, Drew Fudenberg, Peter
Klibanoff, David Kreps, Eric Maskin, a referee, and the associate editor for their helpful
comments. Financial support was provided by National Science Foundation Grants SBR-
9310009 and SBR-9515076.
1 . . . This includes Robinson 1951 , Miyasawa 1961 , Shapley 1964 , and the more recent
.  . . work of Fudenberg and Kreps 1991, 1993 , Jordan 1993 , Krishna 1991 , Krishna and
 . . . Sjostrom 1995a , Milgrom and Roberts 1991 , and Monderer and Shapley 1996 , among
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repeatedly they eventually come to play an equilibrium of the static game.
The fact that the model has received such great attention is probably a
result of people thinking of it instead as a loose representation of the
process by which each individual in a society comes to learn its conven-
tions.
2 With such an interpretation myopia may make more sense and we
might draw much more interesting conclusions, e.g., that two players who
are meeting for the ﬁrst time might be expected to play an equilibrium if
they have grown up in the same society and learned the same conventions.
This paper attempts to develop such an interpretation more fully by
examining an explicit formal model of a large population of players
learning from the personal experience they obtain in of a sequence of
encounters with other members of the population.
3
While the paper is motivated generally by a desire to explore what kinds
of things happen in a large population]personal experience model, the
discussion focuses on two more concrete questions: when is it reasonable
in such a model to assume that players act myopically, and is the outcome
of the learning process robust to a slight relaxation of the myopia assump-
tion in the direction of more rationality. The speciﬁcation of the model
. follows closely along the lines suggested by Fudenberg and Kreps 1993 . A
population of N players is repeatedly randomly matched to play the game
G, and each player observes only the outcome of matches in which he is
personally involved. The one unusual element of the model is that the
population consists of N y 1 boundedly rational agents who follow speci-
ﬁed myopic learning rules along with one patient rational player who
knows that the others are boundedly rational and may attempt to manipu-
late their play.
The primary motivation for this ‘‘one rational guy’’ model is that the
question of when a large population]personal experience story justiﬁes the
assumption that players are myopic can be addressed by asking when the
rational player will play myopically. The ﬁrst main point which the paper
makes is that large populations do not provide as clear cut a justiﬁcation of
myopia as one might have thought. In a 2 = 2 game with two strict
equilibria myopia is justiﬁed if one thinks of the population size going to
inﬁnity with the discount factor of the rational player held ﬁxed, but for
any ﬁxed population size it is also true that for discount factors close
enough to one the rational player can attempt to manipulate the play of
2 . See Fudenberg and Kreps 1991, 1993 for discussions of the possibility of large popula-
tion justiﬁcations.
3 . . . See Canning 1990 , Fudenberg and Levine 1993 , and Young 1993 for discussions of
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the population even after all other players have coordinated on one of the
equilibria. The reason why manipulation may be proﬁtable is that conta-
gion dynamics naturally arise in the process of learning from personal
experience.
4 While the rational player is a small part of the population,
what he does in period t is a nontrivial part of the experience of his period
t opponent and thus may affect how that player plays from period t q 1
on, how he and others play from period t q 2 on, etc. Simulations are used
to help assess the practical relevance of the results, with the primary
conclusions being that nonmyopic play may be practically important when
very strong risk-dominance relationships exist, when players put a large
weight on recent experience, and when a population has a local interaction
structure.
The one rational guy approach also provides a minimal and fairly
natural robustness check in that we can ask whether the predictions of a
model change if we merely allow for the possibility that one player might
be rational.
5 While the result mentioned above makes it obvious that the
stability of equilibria under the learning process will not always be robust,
the further observation which may be of additional interest is that the
nonrobustness is highly asymmetric}the contagion dynamics allow the
rational player to shift play from an equilibrium which is risk dominated to
one which is risk dominant, but not vice versa.
The remainder of the paper presents several examples of things that can
happen outside the class of symmetric 2 = 2 coordination games. One of
these is an admittedly very special example in which a ﬁnite-memory
version of the personal experience ﬁctitious play model always converges
to a state in which the players coordinate on the unique equilibrium of the
game. However, the dynamic process also has a ‘‘nearly stable’’ cycle which
 is a very strong attractor, and in the intermediate run meaning in the ﬁrst
. few thousand or million periods cycling will be much more common than
equilibrium play. In this environment, a single rational player would be
 able to keep the state of play permanently away from the equilibrium or
. any other stable limit set and achieve supraequilibrium payoffs. Other
examples are used to discuss the scope of nonmyopic play in asymmetric
games and how things might be affected by dominated strategies and the
presence of other equilibria.
4 . . See Kandori 1992 and Ellison 1994 for other examples of contagion dynamics. The
potentially interesting observation here is that such dynamics are not found only in fanciful
bootstrapped equilibria.
5 . . See Banerjee and Weibull 1993 , Dekel and Scotchmer 1992 , and Matsui and Rob
. 1991 for other discussions of rationality in learning and evolutionary models.LEARNING FROM PERSONAL EXPERIENCE 183
2. MODEL
The basic model of this paper involves a single population of players
named 1,2,..., N, with N an even number. In periods t s 1,2,3,... the
players are randomly matched to play the two player game G. Assume that
the matching is such that there is a uniform lower bound p ) 0 on the
probability of any two players meeting at any history. The matching is
assumed to be anonymous, i.e., players are assumed to be unable to
identify or distinguish their previous opponents. I write s for the action i, t
chosen by player i in period t, and s for the action chosen by his yi, t
opponent. The personal experience assumption is that player i observes
only s and not the actions taken by any of the players with whom he yi, t
was not matched. In the next three sections the game G will be the 2 = 2
coordination game shown below whose payoff function is denoted by g.
. Assume that the payoffs satisfy a ) d, b ) c, and a ) b, so that A, A
. and B, B are both equilibria with the former pareto optimal. Let m be
. . deﬁned by ma q 1 y m c s md q 1 y m b.I fm-1 r 2 then A is said to
be risk dominant.
AB
Aa , ac , d
Bd , cb , b
Player i’s information at time t is described by a vector h
t g H
t giving ii
the play of player i and his opponent in each previous period. I write
 t . t h , s , s for the period t q 1 information set in which h is followed by iiy i i
player i playing s and his period t opponent playing s . In the models i yi
. that follow players 1 through N y 1 and sometimes player N will be
assumed to follow simple behavioral rules similar to those discussed in
. . Fudenberg and Kreps 1993 and Milgrom and Roberts 1991 . Speciﬁcally,
each player is assumed to have a belief function h : H
t ª S giving the ii
player’s expectation of the play of his opponent. In period t, each of these
players plays a myopic best response to his beliefs, choosing
s g Argmax gs , hh
t . . . i , ts i i
One model of learning which ﬁts into this class is the analog of ﬁctitious
play in which each player in each period plays a best response to the
empirical frequency distribution of actions he has observed. Another
model which reﬂects the notion that players may give more weight to more
recent observations and which is particularly tractable is a ﬁnite memory
version of ﬁctitious play where players use only observations from theGLENN ELLISON 184
previous k periods, i.e., the belief functions h
k are given by i
k 1
kt h hs s Is s s, .  . .  ii y i , t y r k r s 1
. where s for r G t represents an initial ﬁctitious history, and Ix is yi, tyr
the indicator function for condition x being true or false. When discussing
this rule, I will assume also that all players use a ﬁxed mixed strategy not
depending on the history whenever they are indifferent.
3. PERSONAL EXPERIENCE AND CONTAGION
DYNAMICS: A SIMPLE EXAMPLE
The example of this section is meant to illustrate how contagion dynam-
ics may arise when players learn from personal experience and how this
may provide an opportunity for a rational player to manipulate the course
of play. Consider a population of myopic learners with ﬁctitious play
beliefs. In a 2 = 2 game where each player’s pure strategies are A and B
 AB . this means that each player i begins with weights w , w reﬂecting the i,0 i,0
number of times he has ‘‘seen’’ each strategy in some ‘‘ﬁctitious history’’
 AB . before play begins. The weights are updated to w , w over time by i, ti , t
adding one in each period to the count for whatever strategy player i’s
opponent used in that period. At time t player i assumes that his opponent
A  AB . will play A with probability w r w q w . Suppose that the i, ty1 i, ty1 i, ty1
game G is that shown below, and that each of the players initial weights is
. 0,1 . The players will then all play B in the ﬁrst period, their beliefs will




To see how contagion dynamics can arise, suppose that player N were to
 play A in the ﬁrst period of the game and to then revert to following
. ﬁctitious play . Call player N’s ﬁrst period opponent player 1. In period 2,
. player 1 will have weights 1,1 . Hence, believing each strategy to be
equally likely he has A as a best response. He will continue to play A in
. periods 3 through 10 assuming he plays A when indifferent . In period 2
player 1 will likely meet a new opponent, say player 2. By the sameLEARNING FROM PERSONAL EXPERIENCE 185
reasoning as above, player 2 will think that A is somewhat likely and will
also play A in periods 3 through 10. In the likely event that players 1 and 2
do not meet in period 3, they will ‘‘infect’’ two more players who will play
A from period 4 through 10. As the process continues, the number of
players playing A may grow exponentially, with up to four players playing
A in period 4, eight in period 5, sixteen in period 6, and so on.
The growth of this contagion is sufﬁciently rapid that in a population of
100 players it may be the case that every player will have switched to
playing A by the 10th period, in which case A will be played in all future
periods. When this is not the case, each of the players who has seen A
only once in the ﬁrst 10 periods will return to playing B in period 11, and
 the set of players playing A will start to grow again provided there is
. some player who has seen A twice . It is then again possible that everyone
will switch to playing A before the 20th period; otherwise another contrac-
tion will follow the 20th period.
Imagine now that in the model above player N alone is rational and that
he is aware of the fact that the remaining players are ﬁctitious play
learners with initial beliefs concentrated on B. Would player N play
myopically in such a situation, or is he better off trying to upset the initial
equilibrium? It should not be surprising that the answer is that he should
. try to upset the B, B equilibrium if he is somewhat patient. If player N
plays myopically, he receives a payoff of 1 in every period. If instead he
plays A in the ﬁrst period and then follows ﬁctitious play, he suffers a
short term loss in receiving a payoff of 0 when not coordinating in the ﬁrst
period, and may suffer additional losses from failures to coordinate in
some future periods. The potential gain from this strategy, however, is long
. lived}with some probability the population shifts to the A, A equilib-
rium and player N gets a payoff of 10 in all periods after this occurs. When
player N is patient, the possibility of such a long term gain can easily
outweigh the short term loss.
Table I contains numerical estimates of the value of the discount factor
necessary for the strategy described above to dominate the strategy of
myopic play for a range of population sizes. If the model above is meant to
capture the way in which people may learn to play games from the
experience they obtain in day-to-day interactions, we might imagine that
players are involved in tens or hundreds of matches each year. Even
TABLE I
Patience Necessary for Simple Nonmyopic Strategy
Population Size: 4 10 50 100 500 1000 5000 10000
Discount Factor: 0.44 0.55 0.64 0.67 0.74 0.78 0.94 1.00GLENN ELLISON 186
incentives which exist only for discount factors like 0.999 might then be
practically relevant. Given the speed with which play can shift from one
equilibrium to the other in this example, far less patience than this is
necessary for a wide range of population sizes.
4. A MANIPULATION THEOREM AND
SOME CONVERSES
This section discusses more generally contagion dynamics and incentives
to manipulate play in personal experience learning models. The principal
insight obtained is that the contagion dynamics are highly asymmetric and
favor movement toward risk dominant equilibria. The practical relevance
of the results in connection with the justiﬁcation of myopia is also
discussed.
4.1. Properties of Learning Rules
The manipulation theorem of this section will apply to all learning rules
having three properties outlined here. First, I will say that beliefs are
 t . .  t. . monotonic if for all i, t, s , and s , h h , s , ss G h hs. This i yii i i y iy ii i y i
assumption says simply that the strategy which was observed last period is
thought to be no less likely than it was previously. The assumption seems
innocuous for the problem at hand and is satisﬁed by each of the examples
mentioned above.
6
Second, I will say that beliefs are asymptotically majoritarian if for all i, t,
h
t, and for all e ) 0, there exists T such that if t G T and h
t s i i
1 ttt t y 1t y 1 kt .  .  . h , s , s ,...,s ,s is such that h hs G for all k g iiy ii y ii i 2
  . .4  t. . 7 2,4,...,2Int t y t r2 , then h hs G 1 r 2 y e . Informally, the re- ii
quirement is that when s has been played at least half the time in a large
enough number of the most recent periods it is assumed to have a
probability which is not too much less than one-half. The requirement is
similar in spirit to Fudenberg and Kreps’ asymptotic empiricism, although
less demanding in that it only applies to strategies played at least half of
the time, and only sets a lower bound on beliefs in this case. Note that the
standard ﬁctitious play model always has this property, as do ﬁnite memory
ﬁctitious play beliefs with an even memory length.
8
6 . Aoyagi 1996 argues that monotonicity is inappropriate for players who might recognize
cycles or patterns in play. Such cycles, however, will not occur in most of the large population
models considered here.
7Recall that hk denotes the k-period ﬁnite memory ﬁctitious play beliefs. i
8If the memory length is large and odd the property nearly holds and the results presented
below will all go through, provided the game involved has a sufﬁcient degree of risk
dominance.LEARNING FROM PERSONAL EXPERIENCE 187
Finally, I will say that a system of beliefs induces pure strategy con¨er-
gence if for any initial history there is probability one that the population
will eventually converge to a state in which all players play A or all players
play B. The assumption rules out the possibility of play converging to the
mixed equilibrium or perpetually cycling in a nonconvergent fashion. It is
not so much a property of the beliefs as a joint property of the myopic
learning rules which the players are following, the game being played, and
the structure of the population interactions.
It is well known that in a standard two player model ﬁctitious play
beliefs will not necessarily induce pure strategy convergence in games
which have both pure and mixed strategy equilibria. For example, Fuden-
. berg and Kreps 1991 show that in 2 = 2 coordination games we may get
cycles involving persistent miscoordination rather than convergence to
either pure equilibrium. So that the reader will not worry that for this
reason the set of learning rules satisfying all three of these properties
might be empty, I include here a proposition which establishes that ﬁnite
. memory ﬁctitious play learning rules with an even memory length induce
pure strategy convergence in 2 = 2 coordination games. Intuitively, the
reason why this is true is that because of the randomness in random
matching and the contagion dynamics it is always possible for play to take
off on a path toward one of the pure strategy equilibria.
PROPOSITION 1. For k e¨en, k-period ﬁnite memory ﬁctitious play belief
rules induce pure strategy con¨ergence in 2 = 2 coordination games.
The proof of this proposition will be easier to read after seeing Proposi-
tion 2 and hence has been relegated to the Appendix.
9
4.2. A ManipulationTheorem
To examine the justiﬁcation of the assumption of myopic play, consider
now a model in which players 1,2,..., N y 1 react myopically to beliefs h , i
while player N is rational with discount factor d and knows the belief
functions h of the other players. Note that this speciﬁcation makes the i
Nth player more informed about the type of irrationality present than is
reasonable, but still limits him greatly by not allowing him to recognize
9As an aside, it is interesting to note that if players’ choices when indifferent are allowed to
depend on histories, the proposition is false. Whenever mk is an integer we may make play
. converge in time averages to the mixed strategy equilibrium with an appropriate starting
point by assuming particular responses when the players are indifferent. Simply consider a
population in which indifferent players play whatever strategy they used k periods ago and an
initial history in which all players played A in the ﬁrst mk periods and B in the next k y mk
periods. Then, regardless of the realization of the matching, all players remain indifferent and
play cycles through periods in which everyone plays A and periods in which everyone plays B.GLENN ELLISON 188
opponents or observe any aggregate statistics.
10 For myopia to be justiﬁed
by this large population model, we would want to say that the rational
player plays as if he were myopic.
The following proposition identiﬁes a fairly general set of circumstances
in which a single rational player will try to manipulate the play of an entire
population of opponents. Speciﬁcally, such behavior is shown to be optimal
whenever the N y 1 irrational players all have beliefs initially concen-
. trated on the equilibrium B, B which is both pareto inferior and risk
dominated provided that the rational player is sufﬁciently patient. The
. pareto inferiority of B, B makes the rational player want to shift play to
. . the A, A equilibrium. The risk dominance of A, A ensures that he is
. capable of doing so with positive probability .
PROPOSITION 2. Suppose players 1,2,..., N y 1 play myopic best re-
sponses to belief functions h which are monotonic, asymptotically majoritar- i
. ian, and which together with some h ha¨ing these properties induce pure N
 1. . strategy con¨ergence. Suppose further that h hA - m for all i so that all ii
.  myopic players will play B in period 1. If A, A is risk dominant, i.e., if
. m - 1r2,then there exists d - 1 such that for d ) d the rational Nth player
will not play B in e¨ery period.
Proof. If player N plays myopically, he plays B in every period. By the
monotonicity assumption, all other players continue to play B as well, and
player N’s expected per period payoff is b. To show that the myopic
strategy is not optimal, I show that there exists a strategy s
T for player N
which yields a higher expected payoff provided he is sufﬁciently patient
because it causes the population to switch to the equilibrium A with
positive probability. In particular, for a value of T to be determined below,
the strategy s
T will consist simply of playing A for the ﬁrst T periods and
 t . then reverting to myopic play given the beliefs h h . NN
Write s for the vector of actions chosen at time t, and A and B for the t
vectors in which all players play A and B respectively. With the strategy
s
T, the assumption of induced pure strategy convergence implies that in
the limit as d ª 1, player N’s per period payoff approaches
4 4 a Prob s ª A q b 1 y Prob s ª A . . tt
4 Hence, it sufﬁces to show that 'T such that Prob s ª A ) 0 under t
strategy s
T.
10In fact, it is not necessary for the rational player to know the belief functions. It would
 sufﬁce for Proposition 2 for him to know that the rules satisfy the three properties with a
. known T as a function of e .LEARNING FROM PERSONAL EXPERIENCE 189
Using asymptotic majoritarianism and the risk dominance of A, we may
 t. . choose T such that h hA ) m whenever t G T and s s A for 11 1 1 y 1, t9
all t9 - t odd. Deﬁne T analogously for player 2 when he sees A in even 2
4 periods and set T s Max T ,T . Now, consider all realizations of the 12
matching in which player N is alternately matched with players 1 and 2 in
. the ﬁrst T periods an event of nonzero probability . In period T q 1
players 1 and 2 will play A, and all players will henceforth follow their
myopic rules. It now sufﬁces to establish the following
Claim. In a population of N myopic learners with beliefs satisfying
monotonicity and asymptotic majoritarianism, s ª A with positive proba- t
bility if there exists a period T for which two players have beliefs with
 T. h h ) m. ii
The claim may be proved by a simple inductive argument starting from
the initial fact that when N players simultaneously have such beliefs
monotonicity guarantees convergence to A with probability one. If the
result holds when r q 2 players have such beliefs for r G 2 even, suppose
players 1,2,..., r have such beliefs and consider realizations of the match-
ing in which those players are matched among themselves in periods
T q 1,...,Tqt . By monotonicity, each of them plays A in those peri- 1
ods. Asymptotic majoritarianism then guarantees the existence of a t1
such that players 1 and 2 play A in all future periods if they see A in all
subsequent even periods. Hence, consider matchings in which players 1
and 2 are matched alternately with themselves and with players r q 1 and
r q 2 for the next t periods while players 3,..., r are matched among 2
. themselves. Again this event has positive albeit small probability. For t2
sufﬁciently large, the ﬁrst r q 2 players will all assign probability greater
than m to A in period T q t q t . The claim and hence the proposition 12
follow by induction.
While the inductive argument may not make it clear, the process
described above may grow exponentially. If, for example, players 3 through
r had been matched alternately with players not playing A, the contagion
would have doubled with each interval of time periods rather than growing
in size by two players. QED
. Remarks. 1 The assumption that learning is from personal experience
alone is critical. If players observed the outcomes of all matches, one
player’s actions could not signiﬁcantly affect anyone’s beliefs. The effect of
learning from personal experience can be thought of as similar to the
. effect of local interaction discussed in Ellison 1993 in that each player
reacts to the actions of a small number of past opponents. One or a few
actions can thus have an impact on the process, and ‘‘evolution’’ from the
neighborhood of one equilibrium to the other can be both more rapid and
possible given a smaller push away from the initial state.GLENN ELLISON 190
. 2 A direct corollary of this proposition is that in a model with r
rational players there will be no Nash equilibrium in which all r players
. play myopically at all histories . If they did, each of them would ﬁnd
himself in the situation of the one rational player above, and hence have
an incentive to manipulate play.
. 3 While the statement of the proposition only notes that player N
deviates from myopic play at least once, one can deduce from the fact that
manipulation is proﬁtable that player N at least occasionally succeeds in
dramatically altering the course of play. When players use ﬁnite memory
learning rules an even stronger conclusion follows. Because there is no
buildup of experience to deter him, a rational player in such a model will
try to manipulate play again if he ever thinks everyone has returned to
playing B, and hence with probability one he will eventually succeed in
. moving the population to the A, A equilibrium. See part 1 of Proposi-
tion 5.
. 4 The proposition does not establish that a sufﬁciently patient
rational player will behave in a way which is incompatible with Fudenberg
. and Kreps’s 1993 asymptotic myopia. Asymptotic myopia would, however,
be violated if for arbitrarily large t there remains a positive probability of
reaching a state in which player N believes that the population is sufﬁ-
ciently delicately balanced between tipping toward A and B so that he
should again try to push things toward A. I would conjecture that for this
reason behavior is not asymptotically myopic, although such violations may
not be of much interest because they occur with vanishing probability.
4.3. Myopia and Patience
If one wanted to use the large population]personal experience story as
a justiﬁcation for the assumption of myopic play in a standard two player
model, one could have written down a model identical to that used here
and featured instead a proposition like that given below.
. P ROPOSITION 3. Let G be an arbitrary game with s, s a strict Nash
equilibrium of G. Suppose players 1,2,..., N y 1 play myopic best responses
to monotonic beliefs, and that their initial beliefs are such that they all strictly
prefer to play s in the ﬁrst period. Then for any d - 1 there exists a population
size N such that whene¨er N ) N a rational player N with discount factor d
will play myopically in e¨ery period.
Proof. Because playing anything other than s incurs a loss in the ﬁrst
period and all payoffs are bounded, it is possible to choose T and e such
that a rational player will play s in the ﬁrst period if with a probability of
at least 1 y e his opponents will play s in all of the ﬁrst T periodsLEARNING FROM PERSONAL EXPERIENCE 191
TABLE II
Discount Factors Sufﬁcient for Nonmyopic Play
Population Size, N
Payoff, a 4 10 50 100 500 1000 5000 10000
15 0.16 0.35 0.60 0.66 0.73 0.75 0.78 0.79
10 0.23 0.44 0.66 0.70 0.76 0.79 0.87 1.00
8 0.27 0.49 0.69 0.73 0.82 0.86 1.00 1.00
6 0.33 0.55 0.75 0.80 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
4 0.44 0.67 0.91 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
2 0.77 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
regardless of how he plays in the ﬁrst period. If one chooses N sufﬁciently
large so that there is less than an e chance that a player will meet anyone
he has played or anyone who has met anyone he has played, etc., in the
ﬁrst T periods, this is true and thus playing s is optimal. QED
The conﬂicting conclusions of Propositions 2 and 3 arise from changing
the order of the N ª ` and d ª 1 limits. Given this conﬂict, perhaps the
best way to try to understand whether or when nonmyopic play may be
practically important is simply to check numerically whether one rational
player would act myopically for various parameter values.
Table II presents Monte Carlo estimates of how patient players must be
for a simple strategy of playing A in the ﬁrst four periods and then
reverting to ﬁctitious play to dominate ﬁctitious play when initial beliefs
are very weak.
11 A uniform matching model with N y 1 players following
ﬁctitious play learning rules is assumed, with the players’ initial ﬁctitious
histories assumed to consist of having seen B in a single previous period.
Payoffs are as described in Section 2, with b ﬁxed at 1, c and d ﬁxed at
zero, and a varied across the various experiments.
The most striking regularity in the table is that the degree of risk
dominance reﬂected in the payoff a greatly affects the ease with which
play can be manipulated. When a is small and the population size is at all
large we are unable to distinguish the required discount factors from one.
When the degree of risk dominance is more extreme, manipulation is fairly
easy. For a wide range of population sizes the contagion simply grows
exponentially until it takes over, and hence the requisite degree of pa-
tience increases only very slowly. If one takes the numbers in the table
11The discount factor is listed as 1.00 if this simple strategy dominates ﬁctitious play only
for discount factors which are so close to one as to be indistinguishable from one in the
simulations which were carried out. The optimal manipulation strategy would be proﬁtable
for players who are somewhat less patient than is indicated in the table.GLENN ELLISON 192
seriously, one would conclude that nonmyopic play may be relevant when
very strong risk-dominance relationships are present or in not so large
populations.
On the taking seriously question, it should be noted that the calculations
above are based on a model which is in one regard extreme in facilitating
manipulation. Because players are assumed to have very little prior experi-
ence, seeing A once may lead them to change their play. There are some
economic situations where such a sensitivity of behavior to a single
observation seems reasonable. For example, we might expect an individual
who is mugged while walking down a particular dark alley to change his
behavior for a substantial period of time thereafter even if he has walked
down that alley with no ill effects a hundred times before. In a business
context, it is common also to talk of managers as being careful to avoid
making the same mistake twice.
The one experimental paper I am aware of which examines how much
weight players put on their most recent observations relative to accumu-
. lated experience is that of Cheung and Friedman 1995 , which ﬁnds
players to react even more strongly to new observations than is assumed
above. In their random matchingrpersonal experience treatments they
ﬁnd that there is signiﬁcant heterogeneity but that the typical player
. dramatically discounts the distant and even relatively recent past. In
estimating models in which players react to an exponentially weighted
average of their previous observations they typically ﬁnd that the median
player discounts t-period ago observations by a factor of about 0.5
t.
12
While I have to admit that such discounting seems extreme, if each
member of a population were to use such a rule manipulation would be
very easy. The number of players playing A could never decrease and if a
is at least two the rational player needs only to play A once to ensure that
everyone ends up playing A in the long run. Table III reports the discount
factors necessary for playing A a few times and then reverting to 0.5-ex-
ponentially weighted ﬁctitious play to dominate myopic play when all other
players use 0.5-exponentially weighted ﬁctitious play and have initial
beliefs which reﬂect seeing an inﬁnite sequence of B’s.
13 The results
indicate that when players place such a large weight on recent experience,
manipulation no longer requires strong risk dominance relationships and
increases in the population size have a very small effect on the requisite
degree of patience.
14
12They do not always report estimates based on this treatment alone, but ﬁnd such results
both when pooling data from this treatment with data from their other no-history treatment
and when pooling with their other random matching treatment.
13A few is taken to be 10 for a s 2 and 2 for a G 4.
14While computational concerns have led me to stop the table at a population size of 5000,
a rough calculation suggests that for a G 4 manipulation would still be proﬁtable with
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TABLE III
Sufﬁcient Discount Factors with 0.5-Exponential Fictitious Play
Population Size, N
Payoff, a 4 10 50 100 500 1000 5000
10 0.29 0.51 0.67 0.71 0.76 0.77 0.80
8 0.35 0.55 0.69 0.73 0.77 0.79 0.82
6 0.43 0.62 0.75 0.78 0.82 0.83 0.85
4 0.55 0.70 0.80 0.82 0.85 0.86 0.88
2 0.73 0.86 0.95 0.96 0.98 0.99 0.995
Is manipulation a relevant concern other than in situations where
players may react strongly to a single observation? The answer obviously
depends on how unlikely a chain of events is necessary to make the
contagion take off. To give us some feel for this, Table IV repeats the
experiment of Table II but with initial histories consisting of ﬁve observa-
tions of B. Here, manipulation appears proﬁtable in games without an
extreme degree of risk dominance only if the population is very small.
While the table above is more negative on relevance, one can also make
things look a little better by noting that while a population of 10 or 50
players is not what models of learning in a social setting are intended to
capture, large population]local interaction models where each player
mostly interacts with 10 or 50 neighbors may behave similarly. To illustrate
this point Table V reports discount factors sufﬁcient to make nonmyopic
play proﬁtable despite 5 period initial histories in a local matching model
where players interact with their 20 closest neighbors on a circle. In these
simulations it appears that manipulation will be possible in larger popula-
tions if it is possible in a population of 50 players.
15
4.4. Some NonmanipulationTheorems
In Proposition 2, it was shown that a single rational player could shift
play from an equilibrium which is risk dominated to an equilibrium which
is risk dominant. To help clarify how the model’s dynamics are dependent
15To facilitate simulation of the local matching, for this model alone it has been assumed
that random matchings occur asynchronously, with each player being matched on average
once per period. The discount factors are those which are estimated to make a strategy of
deviating from ﬁctitious play to play A in the ﬁrst 10 periods proﬁtable. Note that this change
tends to make manipulation more proﬁtable for players with very small discount factors, as
the speciﬁcation of the random matching allows a player to be matched several times in the
ﬁrst period before any discounting is applied. The standard errors of the large population
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TABLE IV
Sufﬁcient Discount Factors with Stronger Initial Beliefs
Population Size, N
Payoff, a 4 10 50 100 500 1000 5000
15 0.16 0.32 0.54 0.61 0.71 0.75 0.84
10 0.23 0.40 0.62 0.70 0.90 1.00 1.00
8 0.27 0.45 0.76 0.89 1.00 1.00 1.00
6 0.34 0.65 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
4 0.72 0.96 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
2 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
upon risk dominance relationships, Proposition 4 presents a partial con-
verse to this result, showing that manipulation is unproﬁtable when the
initial equilibrium is risk dominant.
. P ROPOSITION 4. For the standard ﬁctitious play beliefs, if B, B is risk
dominant and the initial beliefs are such that all myopic players strictly prefer
B, then
1. For N G 4 player N’s optimal strategy is to play myopically.
2. For no strategy of player N does more than one other player e¨er play
Ai nag i ¨ en period.
. The proof of Proposition 4 is based on the observation that when B, B
is risk dominant players will not switch to A unless they have seen A in
more than half of the periods to date. Clearly, there will never be two or
more players each of whom has played player N more than half the time,
and hence player N’s manipulations cannot directly convince two or more
players to play A. It then remains only to show that he also cannot
TABLE V
Sufﬁcient Discount Factors with Stronger Initial Beliefs
and 20 Neighbor Local Matching
Population Size, N
Payoff, a 4 10 50 100 500
15 0.00 0.08 0.27 0.26 0.25
10 0.03 0.21 0.39 0.40 0.39
8 0.04 0.29 0.52 0.52 0.52
6 0.21 0.53 0.85 0.85 0.85
4 0.70 0.93 1.00 1.00 1.00
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somehow indirectly convince two or more players by ﬁrst convincing one
player to play A, etc. Essentially such possibilities do not exist because the
timing of these additional manipulations makes them of no help. A formal
demonstration may be found in the Appendix.
The second part of the proposition extends the ﬁrst so that we know not
only that manipulation is not proﬁtable, but that it is also impossible. We
can thus conclude that the stability of a risk dominant equilibrium under
ﬁctitious play is robust not only to the introduction of one rational guy, but
also to the introduction of one player of any type.
Note also that the proposition has been stated for ﬁctitious play rather
than for general learning rules. The reason for this is that the conditions
under which manipulation is not proﬁtable vary from model to model and
will not always coincide exactly with risk dominance. In the ﬁnite memory
ﬁctitious play model, for example, manipulation is somewhat easier and
thus turns out to be proﬁtable not only when the initial equilibrium is risk
1 . dominated m - , but also when the initial equilibrium is only ‘‘a little’’ 2
12  . . risk dominant roughly when m g ,. 23
P ROPOSITION 5. In the model with a single rational player and N y 1
players following k-period memory ﬁctitious play rules for k e¨en, N G 4, and
initial beliefs assigning probability one to B:
21 ?@ 1. For mk F k y , there exists a d - 1 such that a rational player 33
with a discount factor of at least d will play nonmyopically and with
probability one he will e¨entually succeed in shifting play to a state where
e¨eryone plays A.
21 uv 2. For mk ) k q , the rational player will play B in e¨ery period 33
and play cannot con¨erge to e¨eryone playing A regardless of the strategy which
the Nth player uses.
Proof. The proof of the ﬁrst part of the proposition is similar to the
proof of Proposition 2 and is left for the Appendix. For the second part it
sufﬁces to show that regardless of player N’s strategy at most one other
player will play A in any given period. To establish this result, suppose not
and let t be the ﬁrst period in which at least two myopic players play A.
uv Call the players 1 and 2. Because each has seen A in at least mk of the
uv previous k periods, there must be 2 mk y k periods in which both saw A
simultaneously. In these periods, at most two players play A, so each of
players 3 through N y 1 face opponents playing B. In the last of these
 uv periods, players 3 through N y 1 have seen A in at most k y 2 mk y
. k y 1 of the previous k periods. Under the hypothesis of the proposition,
uv this number is less than mk so that each of players 3 through N y 1 play
B in this period. This yields a contradiction, because players 1 and 2 could
not have both seen A if they played each other, nor if one of them played
4 a member of the set 3,4,..., N y 1 . QEDGLENN ELLISON 196
Intuitively, the extra ability of player N to affect play in this model
comes from the possibility that manipulations may be bunched together
and hence appear more common in a particular k period history than they
are in the entire history.
5. NONEQUILIBRIUM PAYOFFS AND INTERMEDIATE
RUN VS LONG RUN BEHAVIOR
In the 2 = 2 coordination games discussed so far a single rational player
may cause a shift in play from one equilibrium to another. This section
presents an example involving a 3 = 3 game in which more complex
cyclical contagion dynamics allow a rational player to obtain a payoff
which is higher than is possible in any equilibrium. While the example
itself is very special, it may be of broader interest as an illustration of the
fact that large population learning models may have ‘‘nearly stable’’
behaviors which are more attractive in the intermediate run than are any
of the steady states or cycles which a long run analysis would identify.
Consider the 3 = 3 game shown below, where e is a small positive
.  . number less than 0.01 . Note that B, B is the unique pure strategy
equilibrium of the game and that all mixed strategy equilibria also have a
payoff of one. Suppose that N players play the game in a random
matching setting and follow ﬁnite memory ﬁctitious play rules with a
memory length of 10 periods. As was the case in 2 = 2 coordination
games, random matching is sufﬁcient to break up cycles, so while the two
player model has a number of stable limit cycles, a four or more player
model converges to the unique pure strategy equilibrium from any initial
condition.
16 A proof of the proposition is given in the Appendix.
AB C
A 10 q e,10qe 0,1 0,11
B 1,0 1,1 1,y100
C 11,0 y100,1 0,0
PROPOSITION 6. In the 10-period memory ﬁctitious play learning model
with N G 4 players, play con¨erges almost surely to all players playing B gi¨en
any initial beliefs.
16Seventeen limit cycles are possible in the two player model. The ﬁrst type of cycle has
. . . . . . period 22 and consists of A,C , k = C,C , B,C , B, A ,8 y k =C ,A, C ,B,k =
. .  4  A , A ,9 y k = A , C for some k g 1,2,...,8 or the same with the roles of the two
. .  .  . players reversed . The second has period 20 and consists of 8 = A,C , B,C , B, A ,
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A consequence of the global convergence result is that in a large
population any ﬁnite set of deviations from the rules will have no effect on
the long run behavior of the model. While this might lead one to think that
there is no scope for nonmyopic play in this game, the ability to affect
limiting behavior with a ﬁnite set of manipulations is not a necessary
condition for nonmyopic play. What happens in this example is that a
single deviation from the equilibrium has a dramatic effect on aggregate
. behavior in the intermediate run, and or so I conjecture the intermediate
run beneﬁt can be sufﬁciently large so that a sufﬁciently patient rational
player will deviate inﬁnitely often and achieve a payoff greater than is
possible in any equilibrium.
Let me now describe the unusual cyclical contagion dynamic which the
leaning process engenders in the intermediate run. Suppose that all of the
players have seen only B played in the past, but that one player trembles
and plays A in period 1. His ﬁrst period opponent will assign a probability
of at least one-tenth to each of A and B and hence play A in periods 2
through 10. As in the previous section the set of players playing A begins
to grow in a contagious fashion.
17 After A becomes common things start to
change. There will be an increasing number of players who have only seen
. A and C in the previous 10 periods and who will therefore switch to C.
Later, after most players have switched to C there will be players who no
longer remember seeing A and thus return to playing B. This, however, is
usually not the end of the effects of the single manipulation. Instead,
because different players have different experiences, there will usually be
one player who still remembers seeing A after most others have returned
to B. This player will play A, initiating another cycle in the population.
Hence, while play must converge to B, the convergence may be quite slow
and the distribution of play may move far away from the equilibrium.
Figure 1 illustrates the typical path of play following a single deviation.
For a randomly selected realization of the matching process, the ﬁgure
 graphs the fraction of the population playing A in each period and for the
. 100 player example the fraction playing B as well . Note that instead of
smooth gradual convergence to B we see lengthy dramatic cycles where
the entire population swings back and forth from one strategy to another
 before play eventually locks on to B which is observed here only in the 10
. player example . In the 100 player example, the peak fraction of players
playing B in each cycle looks random and seems typically to be fairly far
from one. We may thus think of convergence to everyone playing B as
requiring a very rare random event.
17Note that while the growth process is still random it is unlike that described in Section 3
in that strategy A cannot simply die out as experience accumulates. Any player who has seen
A in the previous 10 periods cannot play B.GLENN ELLISON 198
FIG. 1. Typical path of play following a perturbation.LEARNING FROM PERSONAL EXPERIENCE 199
. Table VI presents fairly imprecise Monte Carlo estimates of the length
of time until a population of N players return to playing B after a single
perturbation. The length of time for which the population cycles increases
dramatically when the size of the population is increased. Intuitively, what
seems to be going on is that the system has a nearly stable cycle which is
broken up only by an unrepresentative realization of the random matching
involving all players’ experiences being unusually similar so that they all
. return to playing B at about the same time . As the population size
increases, these unrepresentative realizations of the random matching
become more and more unlikely and thus the cycles become more and
more nearly stable.
The version of this model without the single rational player illustrates a
novel way in which intermediate run and long run behavior can differ.
 What we see in Fig. 1 and what seems to happen given virtually any initial
. history is that for thousands or millions of periods the players in the
model will cycle between the strategies. The standard long run analysis of
. this model as contained in Proposition 6 completely misses this in saying
only that eventually everyone ends up playing the equilibrium. Practically
the dynamics would be much better described by a deﬁnition which
allowed the cycle to be labeled as an additional ‘‘intermediate run limit
set’’ which turns out to be a very strong attractor.
Returning now to the model with one rational player, the fact that
aggregate behavior is altered so dramatically by a single manipulation and
that manipulations become more effective in larger populations leads one
to conjecture that for any population size there exists a discount factor
sufﬁcient to make nonmyopic play proﬁtable. Table VII presents addi-
tional simulation results which explore this conjecture. What is recorded in
the table is the limit as d ª 1 of the per period payoff obtained by a
rational player who follows each of three different strategies when the
initial beliefs are concentrated on B. If the rational player plays myopically
. he receives a payoff of one in every period as B, B is played in every
match. The second line of the table gives the payoff received by the
rational player when he follows the strategy which differs from 10 period
memory ﬁctitious play only when the player has seen B 10 times in a row,
in which case he is assumed to play A. The third strategy considered is that
of always playing A. Each of the latter two strategies is more proﬁtable
TABLE VI
Expected Time to Equilibrium Following a Single Perturbation
Population Size: 2 4 10 20 40 60 80
Approximate Expected Wait: 22 24 58 250 4000 40000 400000GLENN ELLISON 200
TABLE VII
Estimated Limiting Payoff of Various Strategies
Population Size
Strategy 2 4 10 50 100 500 1000
Myopic 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Memory 10 ﬁctitious play q manipulation 3.3 2.7 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2
Always A 0.0 0.5 2.9 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3
than myopic play for the larger population sizes listed in the table, and the
pattern of the payoffs in the table suggests that this will be true also in
larger populations.
When the rational player in the model above prefers to manipulate play,
he will deviate from ﬁnite memory ﬁctitious play inﬁnitely often. Other-
wise, play will eventually converge back to everyone playing B, and the
rational player will assign probability converging to one to this having
happened and thus eventually will have an incentive to manipulate play.
Let me say again that the example above is admittedly nonrobust to the
learning rules and is meant just to illustrate possible dynamic patterns.
The assumption of a ﬁnite memory length is critical both because it makes
the contagion easy to get started and because it allows the cycles to recur.
With standard ﬁctitious play rules there would likely be no discount factor
sufﬁcient to induce manipulation in a sufﬁciently large population. The
basic observation that a player may want to manipulate play for a medium
run beneﬁt, however, may be regarded as practically robust in that similar
cycles would make manipulation proﬁtable if the game was played by a few
thousand players following standard ﬁctitious play rules.
6. FURTHER EXAMPLES
This section presents a few more examples illustrating some of the
additional considerations which arise outside of the class of symmetric
2 = 2 games.
6.1. Asymmetric Games
The model of this paper can be extended fairly easily to handle asym-
metric games, where the primary observation I would like to make is that
there is perhaps more scope for nonmyopic play than is made obvious by
the previous results. Consider a model where N player 1’s and N player
2’s are randomly matched to play an asymmetric 2 = 2 coordination game
. .   .  with equilibria A, A , B, B , and m A q 1 y m B, m A q 1 y 11 2LEARNING FROM PERSONAL EXPERIENCE 201
.. mB . The obvious consequence of the basic manipulation theorem is that 2
nonmyopic play will be optimal for a patient player of either type if
m - 1r2 and m - 1r2. What may be more interesting is that manipula- 12
tion will also be optimal in two other sets of circumstances exempliﬁed by
the games
AB A B
A 2,2 y 9,0 A 2,2 0,0
B 0,0 1,1 B y 7,y21 , 1
First, suppose beliefs also have the property that the probability of a
strategy which is seen from time t on approaches one, and consider a game
 like that on the left where m - 1r2, but m ) 1r2. The example has 12
. m s 1 r 3 and m s 5r6. In such a game, a sufﬁciently patient rational 12
player 1 will try to manipulate play. The argument is similar to those of the
previous section and is only sketched here. Consider initial beliefs for
. which play converges to B, and suppose the Nth player 1 N for short 1
plays A in the ﬁrst several periods and then reverts to ﬁctitious play.
Again A and B are steady states of the dynamic system and it will sufﬁce to
show that a positive probability exists of converging to A after the manipu-
lation. If in the ﬁrst T periods players N and 1 are alternately matched 11
with players 1 and 2 , then players 1 and 2 will eventually switch to A. 22 22
Because he sees A in every subsequent period, player 1 will then adopt A 1
. as well for T large enough . In the next T periods suppose that 1 and 2 11
are matched alternatingly with 1 and 2 , while players N and 3 meet 22 11
players 3 and 4 . The ﬁrst group will sustain themselves for the rest of the 22
game, while player N ’s manipulation adds the third and fourth player to 1
the group playing A. Continuing in this way, we reach a state in which
everyone plays A.
 Second, suppose beliefs are asymptotically empirical as in ﬁctitious
. play and suppose m q m - 1. The game on the right above is an 12
. example m s 3r5 and m s 1r10 . In such a game a rational player of 12
either type will want to manipulate play. That a rational player 2 wants to
manipulate play follows from the ﬁrst example. To see also that there is
scope for a rational player 1 to do so as well, again look at the effect of
player N playing A at the start of the game. If player 1 is matched with 12
player N in a fraction m of the periods and with player 1 in the 11 1
remainder, eventually player 1 starts playing A, and this in turn causes 2
. player 1 to switch as well because 1 y m ) m . Again, the contagion 11 2
may now spread to the rest of the population through further manipula-
tions by player N or simply on its own as an additional player 1 is caused 1
to play A which in turn adds another player 2, and so on.GLENN ELLISON 202
6.2. Dominated Strategies
Among games with more than two strategies, the simplest ones to
analyze are those which reduce to 2 = 2 games after the removal of
dominated or iteratively dominated strategies. For example, consider a
3 = 3 game in which C is strictly dominated and the payoffs when A and
B are played are as before. Clearly, all of the results so far showing that
manipulation is possible will remain true with only minor changes. If initial
beliefs assign probability close to one to the risk dominated equilibrium
. B , B , player N can still manipulate play using the same strategy as
before. No strategy other than A or B will ever be played and dynamics
proceed exactly as in the 2 = 2 game. More generally, because no player
other than the rational player will play the strictly dominated strategy,
adding such strategies never reduces the set of opportunities for the
manipulation of play.
On the other hand, the converses in Propositions 4 and 5 do not carry
over so easily. Though they are dominated, the additional strategies
provide player 1 with an additional tool with which to manipulate play. For
example, if we eliminate the dominated strategy in the game below, we
obtain a 2 = 2 game with m s 3r4, so that manipulation is impossible in a
neighborhood of B in both the ﬁnite and inﬁnite memory ﬁctitious play
models. In the full 3 = 3 game, strategy A is much better than B when
there is a signiﬁcant probability of one’s opponent player C. For this
reason, player N can now manipulate play by playing C in the ﬁrst several
periods. When he does so, there is some probability that two or more
players will assign a probability of at least one-ﬁfth to C and switch to
playing A. If these players are subsequently matched, they will continue to
play A while player N’s actions convince more players to switch to A.
. Once enough players are playing A here at least ﬁve of them there is a
positive probability that playing A will spread to the rest of the popula-
tion. The basic point to take away is that dominated strategies cannot be
ignored and may affect the selection the model produces.
AB C
A 2,2 y5,0 0,y20
B 0,y51 , 1 y 20,y20
C y 20,0 y20,y20 y30,y30
6.3. Strategic Risk
Evaluating myopia in games which do not involve simply the addition of
strictly dominated games is much more complicated. It is possible to get aLEARNING FROM PERSONAL EXPERIENCE 203
generalization of the basic manipulation theorem to some games by adding
hypotheses which ensure that the best response to a mixture of A and B is
 . . always either A or B see Kandori and Rob 1993 for an example . With
such an assumption, the same strategy as before will allow a player to
manipulate play away from a strategy which is pairwise risk dominated. In
general, however, manipulation may be made more difﬁcult by the pres-
ence of additional undominated strategies. The game shown below is an
illustration.
ABC
A 12,12 0,0 y 100,5
B 0,0 8,8 y100,5
C 5,y100 5,y100 0,0
In this game, a rational player who tries to shift play from B to A is
faced with the possibility that at some point along the way one of the
. myopic players may assign a probability in the interval 3r8,5r12 to A.
That player will then play C and may trigger a contagion which leads
everyone to play C. In this steady-state, player N receives a lower payoff
than at B, and because C is a best response to any mixture placing
probability at least 1r2o nC , it would be impossible for player N to
manipulate play back to A or B. Because of this type of strategic risk there
may be more stable states once we move beyond 2 = 2 games.
7. CONCLUSION
In this paper, I have tried to take seriously the idea that learning is a
social process in which individuals react to the experience they gain in a
series of encounters with others over the course of their lifetime. The
primary observation which results is that large population behavior is
complex and a variety of contagion and other dynamics arise quite natu-
rally. For this reason, justifying the assumption that players would want to
act myopically may require that population sizes be extremely large.
The dynamics of learning in large populations suggest a tendency for
play to shift toward risk dominant equilibria. The practical importance of
this effect depends on the degree of risk dominance, with selection most
probable when the pareto optimum is strongly risk dominant, and perhaps
otherwise likely only when players react strongly to their most recent
experiences or with local interaction. Further analyses of large population
models may yield other insights unavailable in two player models.GLENN ELLISON 204
A couple of connections with the literature on learning and evolution
. . with noise following Foster and Young 1990 , Kandori et al. 1993 , and
. Young 1993 are probably also worth noting. First, given the rough
similarity between the personal experience model of this paper and Young’s
model of learning by sampling, one might expect that similar dynamics
might make evolution much faster in Young’s model than in the KMR
 model especially if the samples on which players base their beliefs are
. small and the degree of risk dominance is strong . Second, the example of
Section 5 provides another reason to be cautious when applying limiting
analyses to these models. The evolutionary forces created when noise is
added to the example of that section would be powerful}we would expect
to see cycling almost all the time if each member of a population of 100
players were to tremble as often as once every billion periods}but would
not be picked up by the standard limiting analysis.
APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1.
The system of myopic responses to the beliefs generates a Markov
process on the state space of the previous k observations of the players.
The state in which everyone has seen A in each of the last k periods and
that in which everyone has seen B are clearly steady states. Call these
states A and B. It then sufﬁces to show that for any other state z there t
4 4 exists T such that Prob z s A ) 0 or Prob z s B ) 0. Renaming tqTt q T
the strategies if necessary, assume that m F 1r2 and that players play A
. with positive probability when indifferent if m s 1r2. Write Az for the t
number of players with beliefs such that they play A with positive probabil-
ity in period t.
The proof proceeds by considering three cases depending on the value
. of Az. First, in the proof of Proposition 2, a claim is established which t
1 . guarantees with a minor modiﬁcation if m s that play converges to A 2
. with positive probability from any state with Az G 2. Second, the result t
. is trivial when Az s 0 } play is already at B. Finally, it remains only to t
. consider the case of z with Az s 1. tt
For this case, suppose player 1 plays A with positive probability and all
other players do not. Consider realizations of the matching in which
players 1 and 2 are matched in the ﬁrst k periods. If in any period both
play B, then because there is a positive probability they will continue to
play B for as long as their beliefs are not adjusted in the direction of A,
there is a positive probability that the state B will be reached within k
periods. On the other hand, if at least one of players 1 and 2 play A in theLEARNING FROM PERSONAL EXPERIENCE 205
 tqk. t q k . ﬁrst k periods, we have h h q h h G 1. Noting that the player 11 22
who assigns lower probability to A always has his belief increase when at
least one player plays A and that k is even, there must have been an
 tqr. t q r . intermediate period t q r in which h h G 1r2 and h h G 1r2. 11 22
. Hence, we have a state with Az G 2, and there is again a positive tqr
probability of play reaching A. QED
Proof of Proposition 4. Deﬁne z to be the number of past observations it
of player i which would have to be switched from B to A to induce him
 t . .. . to play A. Formally, set z s m y h hAw q t y 1 where w is it i i i i
the sum of the weights in player i’s initial ﬁctitious history. Let
x , x ,...,x be the ﬁrst through N y 1st order statistics of the z . 1t 2tN y 1 t it
To show that at most one irrational player plays A in any given period, I
simultaneously establish conditions I and II below by induction on t.
I: x q x ) 0. 1t 2t
 uv . II: x F 0 « x q x G 2m 1 y x rm . 1t 2t 3t 1t
 uv . The notation x indicates the smallest integer greater than or equal to x.
Given the initial conditions on beliefs, z ) 0 for all i and conditions I i1
and II are satisﬁed at t s 1. To see that they hold at t q 1 whenever they
hold at t, divide the problem into two cases.
Case 1. x ) 0. Here, no myopic players play A in period t, so that at 1t
most one of them has an opponent playing A. Hence,
x q x G x q m y 1 q x q m ) 2m y 1 ) 0, 1tq12 t q 11 t 2 t
and condition I holds at time t q 1.
As for condition II, if x F 0 it must be that player 1’s opponent 1tq1
 played A in period t and the other myopic players’ opponents did not. By
. player 1 is meant the player with the largest z . Hence, itq1
x qx sx qmqx qm)2ms2m 1y x rm , uv . 2 t q 13 t q 12 t 3 t 1 t q 1
with the ﬁnal inequality from x rm G m y 1rm ) y1. 1tq1
Case 2. x F 0. Here, we distinguish between two subcases where 1t
player 1 does or does not meet player N in period t. In the ﬁrst of these,
condition I follows because again at most one myopic player has an
opponent who plays A. In the second subcase, condition I follows because
player 1 does not see A giving
4 x q x G Min x q x q 2m y 1, x qx q2my2 1tq12 t q 11 t 2 t 2 t 3 t
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To establish condition II for the ﬁrst subcase, note that
x q x s x q x q 2m G 2m 1 y x rm q 1 uv . 2 t q 13 t q 12 t3 t 1 t
G 2 m 1 y x r m , uv . 1 t q 1
again because x y x F 1 y m - m. In the second, we have 1t 1tq1
x q x G x q x q 2m y 2 G 2m 1 y x rm q 2m y 2 uv . 2 t q 13 t q 12 t3 t 1 t
) 2 m 1 y x r m y 2 m s 2 m 1 y x r m , uv u v . . 1 t 1 t q 1
with the last line following from x s x q m. This completes the proof 1tq11 t
that conditions I and II hold.
Condition I immediately gives the second conclusion of the proposition.
The ﬁrst conclusion follows from the second, because player N expects to
. meet an A player in each period with probability at most 1r N y 1 , and
this is less than m when N G 4. QED
. Proof of Proposition 5. 1 As a ﬁrst step, I show that s ª A with t
probability one if the rational player N plays A in every period. To see
this, note that as in Lemma 1 we have a Markov process on the state space
of the players’ k period histories and that A is a steady state. It then
sufﬁces to show that there is a positive probability path from every state to
A. To do so, I simply exhibit a realization of the ﬁrst several periods of
matching which guarantees that play converges to A regardless of the
initial state. Suppose ﬁrst that player N meets player 1 in the ﬁrst k
?@ periods. In the next k y mk periods suppose that player 1 meets player
 2, while player N meets player 3. Note that players 1 and N play A in
. ?@ these periods. In the following mk periods, suppose that player N
alternately meets players 2 and 3. After 2k periods a state has been
?@ reached in which players 2 and 3 have seen A in at least k y mk q
?? @ @ ? @ mk r2 of the last k periods. This is at least mk q 1 whenever
?@ ?@ . ?@ k y m k q m k y 1 r 2 G m k q 1, which is equivalent to the assump-
21 ?@ tion mk F k y . In period 2k q 1, players 2 and 3 therefore both play 33
A .
To ﬁnish the argument, we simply repeat the argument above with
players 2 and 3 meeting for the following 2k periods while player N meets
player 1 then alternately meets players 4 and 5 until they switch to A.I n
the next 2k periods we can have player N meet players 1, 6, and 7 until 6
and 7 switch to A, and so on.
Given that the expected per period payoff when player N plays A
approaches a as d ª 1, it is immediate that the probability of play
converging to B when player N uses his optimal strategy must vanish asLEARNING FROM PERSONAL EXPERIENCE 207
d ª 1. To show in fact that play converges to A with probability 1 for a
w . neighborhood d,1 of discount factors, however, requires a little more
work.
. To begin, I show that 'e ) 0 such that for any d g 0,1 player N’s 1
optimal strategy must prescribe playing A whenever he assigns a probabil-
 ity of at least 1 y e to the true state z being A. The state here being the 1 t
. previous k observations of all N players. For any other strategy, let t be
the ﬁrst period in which player N plays B despite having the beliefs above.
.  .  . The expected payoff loss in period t is at least 1 y e a y d y e b y c . 11
The expected gain in the future is bounded above by the gain possible
relative to playing A in every future period which is
`
s < ed Prob z / A z , z / A a y c , 4 .  1 t q st t
s s 1
where the probability term concerns the evolution of the state when player
N plays A in every period. Because the Markov process describing that
evolution converges at an exponential rate, the right-hand sum has a ﬁnite
. limit bounded independently of the initial state as d ª 1. Hence, we may
choose e sufﬁciently small so that any potential gain is less than the short 1
term loss regardless of the discount factor. Because the convergence is
exponential, it also follows that for any h ) 0 there exists d - 1 such that
d ) d implies that player N’s average payoff conditional on any private
history is at least a y h.
Next, note that we may choose T such that player N’s belief satisﬁes
< 4 Prob z s A s s As sA;sg ty1,...,tyT , h )1ye , 4 t y N , sN , st y T 1
and such that there is a positive probability that the contagious process
leads everyone to play ATperiods after the state was B and player N
started playing A. When player N receives a payoff of a for T periods in a
row he plays A for as long as he continues to see A. Hence, if player N
receives a payoff of a for T periods in a row inﬁnitely often there is
probability one of playing converging to A.
Now, choose d such that player N’s average payoff conditional on any
history h is greater than that obtained when he receives a payoff of a in t
at most T out of every T q 1 periods. Suppose d ) d. If play does not
converge to A with probability one when the rational player plays his
optimal strategy it must be that for some k there is a positive probability
of the event L in which he and his opponent play A for T periods in a k
 < 4 row exactly k times. By Levy’s zero or one law Prob L h ª 1 almost kt L k
surely, so there exists a positive probability set of histories H for which tGLENN ELLISON 208
player N assigns probability at least 1 y e to his never again receiving a
payoff of a in T consecutive periods. For e sufﬁciently small this is
impossible given player N’s maximization and the choice of d. Hence, play
converges to A almost surely as desired. QED
Proof of Proposition 6. The dynamics of the model are described by a
Markov process on the ﬁnite state space consisting of the 10 previous
observations of each player. Write B for the state in which all players have
seen B in each of the previous 10 periods. This is clearly a steady state. It
then sufﬁces to show that given any other state s there exists a time T
such that there is a positive probability of the system moving from s to B
in T periods. Note further that it sufﬁces to prove the result for the case of
N s 4 players. If the result holds for N s 4 we may use an inductive
argument to show that it holds for all larger even N, because there is a
positive probability of a realization of the matching in which the ﬁrst four
players are matched among themselves for a time sufﬁciently long to allow
them to all reach B followed by a long period in which players 1 and 2 are
. matched with each other continuing to play B while players 3 through N
are matched among themselves. If the second long period is long enough
for a group of N y 2 players to have a positive probability of all reaching
B from any initial condition, then with this matching there is a positive
probability of all N players having reached B.
To prove the result for N s 4, I consider a large set of possible ﬁrst
period action proﬁles. For each I exhibit a realization of the ﬁrst several
periods of matching which leads to the state B.
It may make the proof clearer to note the order in which I will show that
. ﬁrst period proﬁles give a positive probability of a transition to B: 1 all
. . four players playing B; 2 two or more playing B; 3 one or more B and
. . one or more C; 4 two or more C; 5 two or more A.
1. First, suppose that all four players play B in period 1. This proﬁle
is repeated forever and the state B is reached.
2. Suppose that two or more players play B in period 1, say players 1
and 2. Consider a realization where players 1 and 2 are matched with each
other for a long time. They continue to play B while players 3 and 4
eventually enter one of the limit sets described above. If players 3 and 4
reach the equilibrium we are done. If they reach the ﬁrst type of limit
cycle, we break up the cycle by supposing that after the 12th period of the
 cycle with the ﬁrst period being the proﬁle listed ﬁrst in the description in
. Lemma 2 player 1 meets player 3 and player 2 meets player 4 in periods
. 13 through 34. It is easy to verify that players 1 and 3 play B, A ,
. .  .  . . 9 = A , A , C , A ,9 =C , C, C ,B, and B, B in those periods, and
that players 2 and 4 both play B in all subsequent periods. If instead theyLEARNING FROM PERSONAL EXPERIENCE 209
reach the second type of limit cycle, we obtain the identical path to B if
after the 19th period of the cycle player 1 meets player 3 and player 2
meets player 4 in periods 20 through 41. Players 2 and 4 both play B in all
. . . subsequent periods. Players 1 and 3 play B, A ,9 =A , A , C , A ,
. . . 9 = C , C , C , B , and B, B .
3. Next, consider all proﬁles where one player plays B and one player
plays C. If two or more play B the result follows from the last paragraph.
If the ﬁrst period proﬁle is BCAA, then if players 1 and 2 are matched in
. the ﬁrst period, the second period proﬁle if it does not have two Bs can
be BAAA, BAAC,o rBACC. In the ﬁrst case match players 1 and 3 in
period 2. Players 2 and 3 have memories B then A and A then B of the
ﬁrst two periods, so if they are subsequently matched we get the same path
. as in the previous paragraph starting from 9 A, A ’s, leading both to play
 B which gives a positive probability of getting to the equilibrium by the
. previous paragraph . In the second case matching players 2 and 3 in period
2 implies players 2 and 4 have memories B then A and A then B and we
again get a positive probability of reaching B from the state which occurs
after they meet in the next 21 periods. In the third case matching players 3
. . and 4 they will play C,C for 10 periods and then switch to B, B .
If the ﬁrst period proﬁle is BCCA, then if players 1 and 2 are matched
we either get a state with two Bso rBACA. Either of these gives a positive
transition probability.
If the ﬁrst period proﬁle is BCCC, then we again get a proﬁle with
two Bso rBACC. This again gives a positive transition probability.
4. Now, suppose two or more players play C in period 1. If those two
players are matched in period 1 and in the next several periods they will
.. eventually switch to B,C or B, B . Both of these give a positive
transition probability.
5. Finally, suppose that two or more players play A in period 1.
Matching those two players in period 1 and the next several periods, they
. .  eventually switch to C,C or to A,C which leads subsequently to
.. . B , C or C,C . In any case the result follows from the paragraphs
above. QED
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